

Doctrine for Special Forces Operations
In Stability and Support Operations

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Abstract

Doctrine for Special Forces Operations In Stability and Support Operations
By Major D. Jonathan White, 40 pages

Special Forces (SF) has several characteristics that distinguish it from other forces in the U. S. military. Among these characteristics are a high level of maturity, a broader experience level, and regional orientation. Because of these characteristics, Joint Force Commanders (JFCs) in Stability and Support Operations (SASO) frequently request the inclusion of SF in SASO operations and rely on SF to assist them in accomplishing their mission. One area of concern for SF in SASO environments is that SF has no doctrine that specifically addresses how SF supports SASO mission.

Doctrine should perform three functions. First it should explain to units executing a particular mission what the task will entail. Doctrine also should explain to the JFC and other supported units the nature of a particular task of which a mission consists. Finally, doctrine should guide unit training.

This monograph examines three SASO case studies and how SF performed its mission. The three case studies are Panama, Haiti, and Bosnia. In the case studies, the JFCs assigned SF tasks that frequently they did not perform. This was due to a lack of understanding of what SF could do to assist the JFC in accomplishing the campaign objectives. In each case, SF was able to make substantial contributions despite the lack of a doctrinal mission. In all the case studies, SF units developed frameworks that furthered the JFC's objectives, but were not necessarily what the JFC had directed prior to the start of the operation.

Finally, the monograph makes some recommendations. First, the monograph proposes an umbrella concept for the activities that SF has been conducting in SASO calling the concept, "Pacification and Legitimization." Pacification and Legitimization, as proposed consists of five sub-tasks: reporting, preventive intervention, presence, amelioration, and legitimization. The monograph further recommends that Pacification and Legitimization, however, not be adopted as a Special Operations Mission, but as a collateral activity. Finally, the monograph recommends a possible concept for exercising command and control in SASO for possible inclusion in a Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures manual for SF in SASO.

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Chapter 1 Definitions and Framework

“Doctrine--Fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application.”¹

The purpose of this monograph is to examine the relationship between doctrine and operations. Specifically, the monograph examines the relationship between the doctrine for Special Forces (SF) and the missions Special Forces executes in Stability and Support Operations (SASO). To do this, the monograph focuses on the missions and tasks that Joint Force Commanders have given SF in three SASO environments: Panama (Operation PROMOTE LIBERTY), Haiti (Operation RESTORE DEMOCRACY), and Bosnia (Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR). The intention is to examine these three operations, find commonalties and trends between them, and ultimately to project into the future ideas about what SF will and should be doing in support of the Department of Defense's execution of SASO.

The methodology used is to examine what doctrine is generally intended to do for the force. The author's intention is to look at SF doctrine, and then to look in detail at the tasks and mission that SF has done in the three case studies. The monograph then draws conclusions about the adequacy of SF doctrine in light of how it assists SF in executing its missions in SASO. Finally, the monograph makes recommendations as to possible improvements to existing doctrine to better posture SF for success in SASO environments.

Some authors have stated that SF should acknowledge that SASO will continue to be a mission in which SF will participate.² This debate mirrors the debate in the Army at large

on the inclusion of Stability and Support within the framework of Field Manual 100-5, Operations.³ Since the current Special Forces Operations manual, Field Manual 31-20, was published in 1986, it predates each of the case studies examined in this monograph.

Before examining doctrine, its functions, and how it performed in the case studies, it is necessary to explain why Special Forces are involved in the U.S. military's execution of Stability and Support Operations. Joint Force Commanders desire those attributes and capabilities that are inherent in SF to support the Joint Force in accomplishment of their SASO mission. According to Joint Publication 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations, the characteristics that distinguish SOF from other elements are maturity, experience, regional orientation.⁴

Compared to the other parts of the Army, Special Forces in particular are composed of more senior personnel, both enlisted and officer. To apply for selection and training Special Forces applicants must be specialists (E-4s) or 1st lieutenants (O-2s) with at least one tour in the Army.⁵ Once an applicant is accepted into SF training, each is screened for his ability to operate with limited supervision and his ability to think on his feet.⁶ The junior member of a SF company is a staff sergeant (E-6) and the junior officer is a Captain.⁷ When one compares this to an infantry company in which the junior enlisted is a private (E-2) and the junior officer may be a 2nd lieutenant (O-1) with six months in the Army, the relative seniority of SF is apparent. Of course, this seniority is no guarantee of maturity, but it demonstrates SF's differences and strengths when operating in an environment, such as SASO, which places maturity and judgment at a premium.

The second characteristic of SF, experience, is closely related to that of maturity. Since the designation of SF as an officers branch and career management field for enlisted personnel, the level of experience has deepened in the ranks of SF.⁸ When one compares the average time in the service of an enlisted infantryman (5.49 years),⁹ to that of the average SF enlisted soldier (13.4 years),¹⁰ it is obvious that SF soldiers have an advantage in experience. SF soldiers have served in repeated assignments in SF groups, often the same group with the same regional orientation.¹¹

Finally, comes the issue of regional orientation. According to JP 3-05 Doctrine for Joint Special Operations, "Selected SOF are regionally oriented for employment; cross-cultural communications skills are a routine part of their training."¹² Special Forces take this regional orientation to another level. First, SF soldiers maintain a language capability to augment their regional orientation.¹³ Second, Special Forces conduct repeated deployments to and studies of their mission areas¹⁴ to maintain currency of their knowledge of their AOR.

Joint Force Commanders can use forces with these characteristics in executing their missions in SASO several ways. First, SF is a force that is already familiar with a particular AOR, because of their area orientation and area studies. Second, SF represents a pool of U.S. military personnel who have language capabilities. Thirdly, conventional units may rotate into a SASO mission only once and have to go through the difficult process of learning about the mission area, its actors, etc., only once. SF is regionally oriented to their theater and a particular SF unit may rotate through a SASO mission

several times, avoiding the conventional unit's requirement to learn about the AOR and the particular SASO mission.

The criteria this monograph uses to evaluate the adequacy of SF doctrine come from the functions doctrine performs. Doctrine describes to outsiders what an organization or mission does in a military operation. A supported commander needs to know, at least in general terms, how a supporting command will fulfill its supporting role. Field Manual 100-25, Army Special Operations Forces addresses this issue in its preface. One of the intents of this manual is to provide "[General Purpose] force commanders and staff officers ... a broad understanding of ARSOF (Army Special Operations Forces), [and] their contribution to the overall military effort..."¹⁵

Second, doctrine should describe in detail what a role or mission entails to the unit executing that mission. For doctrine to be effective, it should describe to the unit what it must do to accomplish its mission. The level of detail in this function is clearly greater for the unit executing an operation or mission than an outside unit or agency being supported. Again borrowing from FM 100-25, "the primary user of this manual is the theater ARSOF commander and his staff."¹⁶

The third function of doctrine is that it guides training before operations start. This idea is presented in the most important SOF doctrinal manuals: Joint Publication 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations¹⁷; FM 100-5 Operations; FM 100-25, Doctrine for Army Special Operations Forces; and FM 31-20, Doctrine for Special Forces. By allowing units to focus training before operations, doctrine fulfills an important task. Doctrine helps units understand what must be done to accomplish a given task and insight into how

to accomplish the task. Above all, it prepares a unit mentally to accept the task and understand the construct under which it must be accomplished. Units and individuals can be disconcerted if they are given a task to do in an operational environment if they have never trained or familiarized themselves with that task beforehand.¹⁸

Finally a note on methodology is in order. In trying to assess the adequacy of SF doctrine in SASO environments, it is necessary to use the contemporary doctrine. U.S. military doctrine on SASO is evolving as of this writing (indeed, it never seems to stop evolving, as the SASO environment continues to evolve). Whenever doctrine is cited, the version of a manual or publication at that time is intended. If a subsequent version of a manual is intended, the author will so state.

Having outlined the three functions that doctrine should perform for units, it is now necessary to examine how SF doctrine functioned in the three case studies of Panama, Haiti, and Bosnia.

Chapter II: Panama Case Study: 7th SFG(A) in Operation PROMOTE LIBERTY

“The need [by conventional commanders] for SF soldiers was not only [due] to their language capabilities, but their knowledge of the area and culture. No textbook or training during the [Special Forces Qualification] Course prepared us for the missions we conducted. The mission was [an] SF [one] despite the lack of training.”¹⁹

CPT Stuart Bradin, Detachment Commander, SFODA 775

On the night of 19/20 December, 1989, the U.S. military conducted its largest combat operation since Vietnam and its first since the end of the Cold War. Units from the 82nd Airborne Division, 7th Infantry Division, and the Ranger Regiment conducted nearly simultaneous assaults on vital targets all over Panama. Also involved in these D-Day assaults were elements of the 7th Special Forces Group.

Special Forces were involved with the planning of Operation BLUE SPOON from the beginning of that plan. The 7th Special Forces Group had a battalion based in Panama (the 3rd Battalion) and thus was familiar with the Canal Zone and the potential targets that would have to be secured in the event of hostilities. For this reason, JTF Panama gave the Special Forces Detachments Alpha (SFODAs) of 3rd Battalion the mission of securing these targets on the night of D-Day.

It is not the intent of this chapter to explore the planning and execution of Direct Action targets on D-Day in Operation JUST CAUSE. Instead, this monograph focuses on the follow-on stages and the transition to Stability and Support Operations in Operation PROMOTE LIBERTY.

By the end of D+3 (23 December, 1989), U.S. forces had secured most of the key objectives that the JTF had depicted as decisive points.²⁰ The vast majority of the combat

of JUST CAUSE was over and the JTF quickly started to transition to operations to secure a more lasting and stable Panama. JTF Panama started activities to eliminate the remaining threats to U.S. forces and the friendly Endara Government of Panama. Special Forces were a key component of these activities.

According to LTC Charles T. Cleveland, the S-3 of the 3rd battalion, 7th Special Forces Group at the time, the conventional forces spread out from the areas already under control by U.S. forces (generally the Canal Zone) to the areas still under the control of the PDF. The JTF intent was to prevent the PDF from slipping away into the jungle, caching weapons and starting a long counterinsurgency effort that would have been difficult to defeat and would undermine the success of the invasion to date.²¹

The method used to stop this from happening was to telephone the PDF headquarters or *cuartels* and convince them that surrendering to the U.S. forces was their best option, and then for U.S. forces to deploy to the PDF units' locations and gain control of them. MG Cisneros, the Spanish-speaking commander of U.S. Army South initiated telephone calls to major PDF commanders to try and talk them into surrendering.²² This set a precedent for subsequent actions by Special Forces. At smaller *cuartels*, the JTF would dispatch an infantry company to take control of the PDF. Before the infantry company arrived, a SF unit would telephone the *cuartel* and tell the PDF commander in Spanish what was going to happen. The Special Forces would convince the PDF commander that resistance was futile and that cooperating was in the best interest of the country and the PDF personnel.²³

As Special Forces spread out to the countryside and the PDF garrisons were contacted, their mission evolved. The Special Forces conducted operations in conjunction with the conventional forces also deployed throughout Panama. While conventional forces distributed units as small as infantry battalions, the 3rd Battalion 7th SFG(A) deployed 24 SFODAs individually throughout the country.²⁴

The distribution of Special Forces differed from that of the conventional forces operations because of those characteristics that make Special Forces different from conventional units: regional orientation and language ability, maturity, and experience. The regional orientation and language ability, as well as the maturity of the SF teams meant that they did not need close supervision to ensure that they were taking the right actions. The regional orientation and experience level of the SF teams meant that they were aware of the impacts of *latino* culture on operations in Panama. These characteristics gave Special Forces the ability to deploy more widely, operate more intimately with the Panamanian people, and more discreetly.

The operations the Special Forces conducted were non-doctrinal. The Special Forces conducted operations that a SOCSOUTH J-3 officer later called "pacification."²⁵ Generally, the Special Forces did four main tasks for the JTF. First, chronologically, the SFODAs ensured the professionalism of the PDF and ensure the rule of law. By virtue of their language ability and geographic dispersion, the teams received reports of alleged weapons cachés and investigated those that seemed likely. A related task SF teams performed was to "vet" the PDF members based on the SFODA's initial contacts with the PDF. The SFODAs recommended the dismissal of those PDF members that should not

be allowed, based on their past conduct, to become part of the new Panamanian National Police (PNP). The SF teams worked to shore up the legitimacy of the Endara government and the U.S. effort in Panama by conducting small scale Civic Action projects to show the Panamanian people that the Endara government and thus the U.S. effort were beneficial to the Panamanians.²⁶ Finally, the SF teams reported to the JTF, through the JSOTF chain of command, what the attitude of the Panamanian people was to the Endara government and the U.S. mission.

It is interesting to note what Special Forces did not do during PROMOTE LIBERTY. Special Forces, particularly 3rd Battalion 7th SFG(A) did not conduct the training of the new PNP. This decision was made for several reasons. First, the U.S. Congress did not want the military involved in the training of the PNP.²⁷ Second, even though 3-7th SFG(A) was possibly the most experienced battalion in the Army at conducting Foreign Internal Defense (FID),²⁸ the battalion was decisively engaged elsewhere conducting the "pacification" operations described above. Third, the civilian leadership, both Panamanian and U.S. wanted the PDF abolished and a new force for maintaining public order.²⁹ Consequently, the U.S. Ambassador requested that the U.S. Department of Justice deploy the International Criminal Investigation Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) to Panama to conduct the training of the PNP.³⁰

The execution of the "pacification" mission by Special Forces helped further U.S. military goals in Panama and solidified in the attitudes of the people the gains made during the combat phase of JUST CAUSE. This mission was successful but not doctrinal. The SF doctrine did not describe to the JTF commander or to other

components of the JTF what Special Forces would be doing in this operation. Doctrine did not inform the Special Forces units themselves about the mission they would be doing. Finally, doctrine did not guide unit training prior to execution.

First, let us look at the issue of the JTF and adjacent units. The JTF had conventional units distributed throughout Panama, frequently doing the same tasks that SF was doing. SF was more widely distributed and in smaller units. This would indicate that the doctrine for SASO was not sufficiently refined to differentiate between those tasks conventional infantry units do and those SF does. Also of note is the fact that Special Forces units were not doing the one task that SF could do better than any other military unit: training the PNP.

Second, doctrine should enlighten SF units as to what their mission entails. SFODAs were not sure what their mission was in any specific terms. An After Action Report from one of the team leaders illustrates the point. One team leader from 3-7 SFG(A) wrote in his after action review that "many [Special Forces soldiers] look at this as a mission of some Spanish speaking police unit and not an SF mission. They feel that we are not trained in the type of training (sic) needed in this environment."³¹

Third, doctrine failed to guide unit training prior to the start of Operation PROMOTE LIBERTY. 3rd Battalion 7th Special Forces Group was arguably the premier FID battalion in the U.S. Army. This battalion had deployed ODAs throughout Latin America, furthering U.S. theater military relations by training the militaries of friendly nations. In the opinion of the battalion operations officer, the extensive FID experience may have limited the battalion's preparedness to conduct the Direct Action missions the JTF

assigned to the battalion during the combat phase of JUST CAUSE³² and some soldiers felt that their training had not been adequate to prepare them for their missions in PROMOTE LIBERTY.

Thus our first case study shows that doctrine was not adequate to assist SF units in accomplishing their mission in a SASO environment. This is not to say that the mission was a failure or that SF did not contribute to the JFC's overall success. Contemporary SF doctrine may not have adequately helped SF units contribute.

Chapter 3 Haiti Case Study: 3rd SFG(A) in Operation RESTORE DEMOCRACY

On 19 September, 1994, the U.S. military executed the next contingency operation that serves as the second case study. The Joint Task Force developed four main Operations Plans (OPLANs) for the Haiti mission depending on the operational context and degree of cooperation by the Haitian military. One Operations Plan, OPLAN 2370, assumed a “forced entry” option using the 82nd Airborne Division.³³ OPLAN 2380 called for a permissive entry by the 10th Mountain Division and assumed a higher level of cooperation by the Haitian military.³⁴ Late in the planning, as it appeared that a hybrid plan was necessary, the JTF developed another OPLAN, named OPLAN 2375, that assumed a “semi-permissive” entry.³⁵ Finally, just prior to execution, due to President Carter’s intervention, the U.S. military had to develop and execute a final plan, called 2380-Plus.³⁶ All of these plans called for extensive involvement of U.S. Army Special Forces in post-hostilities phases.³⁷

The role of the Special Forces in these plans (with one exception) was generally the same. The major exception was that, in the forced entry option (OPLAN 2370), SF would conduct Direct Action missions against selected *Forces Armées d’Haiti* (FAD’H) targets during the assault phase. Thereafter, all the OPLANs³⁸ were similar in the tasks they gave to SF. SF had the task of conducting Foreign Internal Defense, or training of the FAD’H. The purpose and objective of this training was to “professionalize” the FAD’H and show the FAD’H “how a military operates in a democracy.”³⁹ As events played out, the 3rd SFG did not execute the FID mission with the FAD’H foreseen in the OPLAN.

3rd SFG(A) did not conduct the FID mission for three main reasons. First was the intention of the U.S. government to use civilian police trainers to emphasize the civilian nature of the future Haitian National Police (HNP). Early in the planning process, the ACOM planners wanted the U.S. Department of Justice to conduct the training. During the planning phase, the DOJ representative to the Haiti planning group told the group that DOJ was not ready to conduct this training.⁴⁰ This may have influenced the planners to assign the training of the FAD'H to the SF in OPLAN 2370. Before the training started, however, the Department of Justice had changed their assessment on whether they could do the mission of conducting the training of the HNP. The JTF gave it to the International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP).⁴¹

The second reason that the Special Forces detachments working in the countryside did not conduct the training of the FAD'H was that they came to realize how hated the FAD'H was in the eyes of the Haitian people. According to COL Boyatt, the commander of the 3rd SFG(A), the hatred harbored by the Haitian people for the FAD'H exceeded the expectations of the planners.⁴² In fact, the depth of this hatred made any reforming of the FAD'H impossible. The Haitian National Police had to be built from new material.

The final reason that SF did not execute the mission assigned to them in the OPLAN was that they had found something else to do. This included a broad array of tasks that could be called "presence" or "pacification." The first and most immediate task the Special Forces carried out was to establish contact with the deployed FAD'H units throughout the AOR.

The initial reason for this was to gain control over the FAD'H and let them know that the U.S. military was in charge. In the longer term, COL Boyatt's intent was to establish contact with the FAD'H, "gain control of the Haitian military and just keep a lid on them."⁴³ This was a first necessary step to enhancing the legitimacy of the U.S. mission in Haiti. First, gaining control of the FAD'H, but keeping them working as a police force would answer one of the criticisms of the Lavalas movement by Cédras' political party (FRAPH). The FRAPH had asserted that Lavalas was a violent movement and the heavy-handed use of force by the FAD'H was the only way to maintain control of the explosive Haitian society.⁴⁴ The SF-supervised functioning of the FAD'H showed the Haitian population that the choice between FAD'H thuggery and Lavalas "mobocracy" was a false one. Order and respect for human rights were both possible. This supervision enhanced the legitimacy of the U.S. military in Haiti by showing the Haitian populace the practical benefits of the U.S. operations: namely, ending of FAD'H oppression, but a maintenance of law and order.⁴⁵

The second function of supervising the FAD'H in the execution of their police functions was the vetting of the individual members of the FAD'H. The ACOM plan had always called for the FAD'H to be retrained. As events unfolded, the FAD'H proved to be so hated by the population that it was irreparable as an organization. Some individuals, however, could be retained for use in the new Haitian National Police. The selection or "vetting" of the FAD'H members fell in large measure to the Special Forces detachments in the field. There, the SF soldiers could watch the FAD'H in action, evaluate their professionalism, and listen to local civilians for testimony as to the human

rights record of individual FAD'H members. This information was fed into the decision to retain individual FAD'H members in the HNP.

Another activity that the SF soldiers performed under the pacification rubric was that of Civic Action. The goals of these actions were varied. First, immediately after the landing of the U.S. forces in Haiti, the SF teams reported to the JTF that the electricity system of the country was frequently not operating. This, in turn, made establishing law and order difficult. Without electricity, lawless elements ruled the night in Haitian towns. In an effort to enhance mission legitimacy, the JSOTF started Operation LIGHTSWITCH.⁴⁶ In this operation, the JSOTF provided fuel oil to Haitian towns to enable them to run the electric generators that provided the town's electricity. This helped force protection for the SF team in the town and enhanced legitimacy of the U.S. mission by showing tangible benefits to the population of the U.S. presence.

Another Civic Action activity that SF soldiers performed was getting the Haitian courts opened and functioning. Before the U.S. military operation, the courts had been closed for long periods, cases backed up and accused individuals denied trial due to lack of courts. SF soldiers throughout Haiti got Haitian judges back on the bench to hear cases, or found replacement judges for those who were missing. In this way, the court system was back in operations (however sporadically), law and order reinforced, and thus U.S. military legitimacy enhanced.

Finally, and perhaps most significantly, SF performed a local "sensing" function that paid dividends to the JFC. The force protection posture of the 10th Mountain Division minimized the risk of casualties to the soldiers of the division. While the brigade-sized

bases at Port-au-Prince and Cap Haitien protected soldiers, it also made meaningful contact with the Haitian population difficult. Special Force's language training, regional orientation, and maturity made it possible for them to deploy to and stay in the towns in the countryside. The experience and maturity also allowed SF to adopt a less threatening force protection posture. All this gave the SF teams the ability to interact with and report on the attitudes and opinions of the populace. In this, SF arguably made their most significant contribution to the JFC's mission accomplishment.

SF reporting showed how effective JTF campaign plans were. They also provided a feedback loop to guide JTF actions toward accomplishing the JTF campaign goals. This, it must be noted, is not a doctrinal SF mission. But it was the most important function carried out by SF in Haiti.

The SF did not execute the mission they were given, but they did conduct operations that were much more effective for the JFC. The SF teams reported the "rhythm of the streets," the local attitudes and opinions of the Haitian populace that were the "decisive terrain" for SASO. This occurred despite the fact that this sort of activity does not fit into any doctrinal mission of SF.

Evaluating how SF doctrine functioned in RESTORE DEMOCRACY compared to what doctrine should do illustrates the inadequacy of SF doctrine in Haiti. First, doctrine informs other units as to what SF is doing. Prior to executing the mission, the JTF had an idea of what SF would do to support the JFC's campaign plan. The OPLANs for Haiti called on SF to conduct FID, and, in the case of a forced entry into the country, Direct Action. Since the intervention of President Carter made the forced entry option

unnecessary, 3rd SFG(A) was left with the FID role. The OPLANs called on SF to conduct training of the FAD'H. This was not executed for three reasons. The Ambassador did not want military forces training what would be a civilian police force. The Department of Justice deployed the ICITAP to train the HNP. Finally, SF was engaged elsewhere.

The most interesting doctrinal issues occur here. The most productive function that SF performed was not to be found in SF doctrinal manuals. The "pacification" activities of SF were extremely important to the overall success of the JFC. These activities fell into three main categories: supervision of the FAD'H in the execution of their police duties (until the HNP could be selected, trained, and fielded), the vetting of the FAD'H members for inclusion in the new HNP, and selected Civic Action projects to improve U.S. force protection and enhance the legitimacy of the U.S. military. Finally, the SF teams in the countryside submitted reports to the JTF on the local attitudes and opinions of the Haitians. Here the SF teams made what may be their greatest contribution to the success of the U.S. military in Haiti.

Second, doctrine tells SF what it will do. In this, doctrine also fell short in Haiti. The mission of the Special Forces from the OPLANs was to conduct FID. SF did not carry out this mission in Haiti. The activities that SF did execute were not to be found in any SF doctrinal manual. The initiative and maturity of SF soldiers were more important guides of the activities of SF in Haiti than doctrine.

Finally, doctrine guides unit training. Doctrine was not adequate in this regard either. The 3rd SFG(A) had trained for FID before going to Haiti. They had conducted no

training prior to the execution of the Haiti mission that prepared them for the role they actually performed there.⁴⁷

This is not to say that SF support to JTF Restore Democracy was a failure. On the contrary, the support of JTF 190⁴⁸ was excellent and contributed substantially to the overall success of the U.S. military in Haiti. SF doctrine, however, was not as supportive as it could have been. Had SF doctrine been up to date and reflecting the reality of operations that the 3rd SFG(A) conducted in the field, SF may have been even more successful in Haiti.

Chapter 4 Bosnia Case Study: 10th SFG(A) in Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR/JOINT GUARD

In December, 1995, NATO troops assumed responsibility from the United Nations Protective Force (UNPROFOR) for the peacekeeping mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The new NATO force, called IFOR (Implementation Force), brought a number of advantages that its UN predecessor did not have. IFOR had a stronger, heavier military capacity, a more robust set of Rules of Engagement (ROE), and a more streamlined command and control structure. Perhaps most importantly, IFOR had a political construct under which to operate, the Dayton Peace Accords. While a representative of the Bosnian Serbs had not signed the Dayton Peace Accords, *per se*, Slobodan Milosevic's signature gave Dayton some credibility in the eyes of many of Bosnia's Serb population.

The involvement of U.S. Special Forces followed the general U.S. Army deployment to Bosnia. The majority of the military units in Bosnia during the deployment of IFOR were from NATO countries. Some of these units simply changed their blue UN helmets to NATO camouflage ones. There were a number of non-NATO units taking part in UNPROFOR and NATO welcomed their participation in IFOR. This created some problems with integrating non-NATO units into a NATO structure and brought about the first mission in IFOR for U.S. Special Forces: the Liaison Coordination Element.

A Liaison Coordination Element or LCE was a Special Forces Operational Detachment Alpha augmented with a Special Operations Tactical Air Control airman. The mission of the LCE was to accompany a non-NATO unit in its duties, advise the non-

NATO unit on NATO procedures, provide NATO-compatible radios, English language ability, fire support, air support and medevac support as needed.⁴⁹ The 10th SFG(A) provided LCEs with the appropriate language ability to the Hungarian Engineer Battalion, the Romanian Engineer Battalion (both IFOR assets), the Russian Airborne Brigade, the Turkish Brigade, the Polish Airborne Battalion, all assets of the Multinational Division - North (also called MND-N). The 10th SFG(A) also provided an LCE to the Czech Battle Group of Multinational Division - Southwest (MND-SW). The 1st SFG(A) provided an LCE to the Malaysian Battle Group of MND-SW and the 5th SFG(A) provided an LCE to the Egyptian Battalion of Multinational Division - Southeast (MND-SE).

The LCEs functioned well in a relatively straightforward mission. Over time, the need for the LCEs diminished as non-NATO units developed the capabilities SF had provided. The non-NATO units received or procured the communications equipment needed for effective integration with a NATO command structure. They deployed or developed an effective English language capability. As the lessening threat made the need for Close Air Support and medevac support less essential, the need for LCEs diminished. Consequently the LCEs with most non-NATO contingents were closed down. By November 1996, only the Hungarian Engineer Battalion and the Russian Airborne Brigade still had LCEs.⁵⁰ The purpose of including information on these LCEs is simply to show that U.S. Special Forces were involved from the beginning of the U.S. military's presence in Bosnia and that the existing doctrine was adequate for this SF role.

Starting in the fall of 1996, the role of U.S. Special Forces in Bosnia changed. As the UK-led ARRC transitioned to a US-led LANCENT headquarters, the UK-led Combined

Joint Special Operations Task Force (CJSOTF) transitioned to a U.S. led CJSOTF. At the same time, US elements replaced UK elements called Joint Commission Observers or JCOs. The term JCO was not a doctrinal one in the U.S. military and the functioning of U.S. Army SF was adapted to the Bosnian context.

To understand the role of the JCOs, it is necessary to understand how they came into being. The JCOs had first been deployed in 1994 by the Commander of UNPROFOR's Bosnia-Herzegovina Command, MG Michael Rose (UK), ostensibly to provide impartial observation of cease-fires and other agreements between the factions negotiated by the Joint Military Commission (hence the "Joint" in the name Joint Commission Observers). Once the transition between UNPROFOR and IFOR occurred, the UK JCO teams stayed in place and functioned as a "directed telescope" for the (UK) Commander of IFOR, providing tremendous institutional knowledge to COMIFOR and especially to the U.S. Commanding General and staff of MND-N.⁵¹ The information the JCOs provided the US 1st Armored Division was unusually valuable because the U.S. military was a relative novice to the Bosnian scene compared to the UK and French divisions around which Multi-National Divisions Southwest and Southeast were built. The other two MNDs, each led by a UK and French division, were not "starting from scratch" as the U.S. division was.

The Joint Commission Observers consisted of six men, living in the towns and villages, wore simple uniforms without rank or unit insignia and no helmets or flak jackets. They thus presented a less threatening image to the local population, and were thus more approachable. The UK JCOs, deployed only on the Serb side of the IEHL, had

developed relatively close personal relationships with significant Serbian leaders, especially Serb military leaders.⁵²

This was particularly important to the U.S. Army's 1st Armored Division, which had the early critical task of separating the armed forces of the faction and getting them into weapons storage sites. Knowing the Serb military leaders, how they thought, and where to find them proved valuable during a crisis. JCOs were instrumental in defusing crises during this early period because of their close personal relationships with the military leadership, especially Bosnian Serb military leadership.⁵³ Heavy weapons were stored in weapons storage facilities and could no longer be withdrawn without the approval of the MND and the MND had sufficient military power to enforce the regimen.

In the fall of 1996, the operational environment in Bosnia saw significant changes. First was the replacement of the 1st Armored Division by the 1st Infantry Division scheduled for October 1996. The 1st Armored Division had done the hard jobs of creating the Zone of Separation (ZOS), separating the Former Warring Factions (FWFs), and getting the FWF militaries heavy weapons into Weapons Storage Sites (WSSs). This led to the second significant change: the changes in the means the factions used to pursue their political goals. With the withdrawal of heavy weapons into WSSs and strict enforcement by IFOR (including the confiscation and destruction of some heavy weapons), the FWF military became increasingly marginalized in the political discourse between the factions.

The very success of the 1st Armored Division in the WSS regimen had created a whole new problem set for the incoming 1st Infantry Division (1st ID). The FWF military

leadership had lost much of their former significance in Bosnian politics because of the stringent weapons storage regimen. Once heavy weapons are stored in WSSs, inventoried and restricted from movement except with SFOR's approval, the militaries were marginalized. The inter-ethnic political conflict did not stop, however. It merely shifted to other means, means that circumvented the weapons storage regimen. Resettlement, propaganda, and police, became the arena in which the factions played out their conflict. Thus means of accessing and assessing local attitudes and opinions became more important for the 1st Infantry Division than they had been for the 1st AD.

Coincidentally with the replacement of the 1st Armored Division with the 1st Infantry Division, the UK wanted to end their participation in the JCO role. The incoming 1st Infantry Division commander sought assistance from US Special Operations Forces on the problems the 1st Infantry Division would face in Bosnia. The CG, 1st Infantry Division and COMCJSOTF agreed to the assumption of the JCO role by US Special Forces and the expansion in the number of JCO teams in MND-N from 2 to 12. By mid-March, 1997, the 12 US JCO teams had completed their deployment.

The concept of employment for the JCOs in MND-N was not specifically defined.⁵⁴ Under IFOR, when a UK general officer, LTG Walker, the Commander of the ACE Rapid Reaction Corps (or COMARRC) was the ground force commander in Sarajevo, the UK JCOs had functioned as a "directed telescope" for COMARRC. The JCOs gave COMARRC an UK unified, country-wide view of what was happening in his AOR.

Once the US JCO teams replaced the UK teams, their manner of employment changed. First, there was no doctrine outlining how JCOs should or should not be used. The


command and control of JCO operations was subject to wide interpretation by various agencies. Since the Commanding General of MND-N was instrumental in the deployment of US JCO teams and the expansion in the number of teams in the program, the MND-N commander believed the program would be an MND program versus an SFOR one.⁵⁵ Second, the balance of forces deployed throughout the AOR changed. Under the UK sponsorship, the JCO program was more balanced among the MND sectors. Under the US sponsorship, twelve of the sixteen JCO teams were in MND-N, compared to three in MND-SW and one team in MND-SE.⁵⁶ Decentralizing control of the JCOs' operations to MND-level brought a risk to the overall program: changes in JCO *modus operandi* in one MND had impacts on the other MNDs' JCOs and on COMSFOR's overall program.

Finally, which staff agency in MND-N was to control JCO operations was another nebulous area. Under the UNPROFOR period, the JCOs had worked as Observers for the Joint Military Commission. Given the emphasis on IFOR relations with the FWF militaries during the IFOR period and the fact that the JCOs already knew the FWF military leadership, the JCOs in MND-N remained under the overall supervision of the JMC. As the FWF militaries became marginalized, the validity of assigning staff supervision of JCO operations to the JMC was reduced.

The SF command structure was slow to develop its Command and Control (C2) architecture to direct the operations of the deployed JCO teams. During the inaugural rotation of the US JCOs (DEC 96 - MAR 97), the direction of operations consisted of providing the team with a copy of the MND PIRs and allowing the teams to tailor their

operations to their particular AORs. The JCO team leadership decided which local leaders the team talked to and what messages they presented. There was no mechanism for accessing the campaign plan (SFOR's or the MND's) and directing actions of the JCOs to support the SFOR campaign plan. What actions the JCOs undertook daily were almost solely the decision of the JCO team leadership in the field.

Each battalion of the 10th SFG(A) rotated through the Bosnia mission. Each was trying to make the JCO program as supportive of COMSFOR and the MND headquarters as possible. This also meant being responsive to the emerging needs of COMSFOR and the MNDs. The most significant issues for SFOR in the summer and fall of 1997 were resettlement and municipal elections. In December, 1997, 3rd Battalion, 10th SFG(A) assumed the direction of the JCO mission in Bosnia for the second time. The 3rd Battalion brought with them a model for controlling JCO operations and focusing them on supporting the SFOR campaign plan.⁵⁷



This process started with examining the “Operational Imperatives” of the campaign. The Battalion derived these from General Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP), SFOR PIR’s, CJ-3 input, and MND commanders’ guidance. Next, the Battalion tracked the “JCO Footprint,” that is to say, which individuals the JCOs had met with, expressed both geographically and functionally, with what frequency, and to what level of intimacy. Next, in light of the “Operational Imperatives” and the “JCO Footprint,” the Battalion staff developed a list of those individuals in the AOR who were likely to be important during the future of SFOR’s campaign, and “targeted” the relevant JCO team to increase the frequency or the intimacy of its meetings with the individual.

An example illustrates how this system worked. The Brcko Arbitration announcement was a potential crisis for SFOR in the winter of 1998. The town of Brcko lies athwart a thin neck of land uniting the two main regions of the *Republika Srpska* (Serb Republic): the Banja Luka area in the west and the eastern region along the Drina River in the east. Muslims claimed that they had to have the town in order to have access to the Sava river and the commerce thereon.⁵⁸ “Losing” Brcko to the Muslims would divide the Serb

entity in two parts, which explains why the Serbs are so attached to the town. The town was ethnically mixed when the fighting broke out in 1991 and the Serbs quickly succeeded in cleansing Brcko of its Muslim inhabitants. The Muslims, however, did not retreat far and the confrontation line between the Muslims and Serbs rested six kilometers south of the Sava for most of the war. The Confrontation Line was still there when the Dayton Accord was signed: the Serbs held the town, the Muslims held its southern suburbs.

The Dayton accords, however, stipulate that an international tribunal would decide the final status of the town.⁵⁹ The General Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP) outlined that the tribunal would consist of one Serb and one Federation member and one appointed by the president of the International Court of Justice. The GFAP further stipulated that the tribunal would meet within six months of the deployment of IFOR and decide the final status of Brcko within one year of the signing of the GFAP. In February 1997, the Office of the High Representative in Sarajevo announced that a High Commissioner would be named to Administrate Brcko for one year and would supervise the implementation of measures to build confidence among the entities. U.S. Ambassador Robert W. Ferrand was named as the Deputy High Representative for Brcko. The final status of Brcko would be delayed one year.

This set the stage for the involvement of U.S. Special Forces JCO teams in furthering SFOR's goals vis-à-vis Brcko. SFOR and MND-North headquarters both had assessed the likely responses of the entities to an arbitration announcement that was perceived to be against their interests.⁶⁰ The success of the military storage regimen had rendered the

entity militaries relatively non-viable as a policy option for the entities. Recent SFOR experience, however, indicated that the entities, especially the Serbs, would not quietly accept any decision that was against their vital interests. The Serbs may not respond militarily, but they would respond, frequently with riots and demonstrations, and by other, perhaps more violent, means.

The SFOR and MND-N commanders and staffs had close ties with the entity military leadership through the use of the Joint Military Commission (JMC) and Faction Liaison offices. Using the existing communications channels, COMSFOR and Commander, MND-N could coordinate with entity military leadership and attempt to defuse any military confrontation over the arbitration announcement. The connectivity of SFOR with other influential members of Serb and Federation society was less close and murkier. This was an area in which SF could contribute.

The battalion staff examined the depth and frequency of contact between the JCO teams associated with the Brcko issue. This was determining the "JCO footprint." This "footprint" was expressed both in terms of frequency of contact with an individual (for example, the JCO team met the Brcko Police Chief weekly) as well as the depth of that contact. Meeting in a person's office, meeting in a bar, and being introduced to a person's family all express different depths of contact that were qualitatively different. Having a close personal relationship with the right local leader could be very valuable in a crisis.

In the second step, the battalion, co-located with the SFOR staff, and the Special Operations Command and Control Element (SOCCE) at MND-N, determined the

overarching operational goal of SFOR and MND-N in conjunction with the Brcko announcement: generally, a peaceful implementation of the arbitration decision. The Battalion and SOCCE conducted an independent assessment of the threats to that goal (demonstrations, provocations, sabotage, etc.).

Next, the battalion and SOCCE determined which influential members of Bosnian society at various levels (national, regional, and local) would be in a position to cause or discourage actions detrimental to SFOR's goal. These people, by virtue of their position and attitude carried influence in Bosnian society and were termed "the influence hierarchy" by the battalion. The influence hierarchy categories used by 3-10 were: political, military, police, civil, media, NGO, economic, and criminal.⁶¹

Finally, in the weeks leading to the arbitration announcement, the battalion and the SOCCE manipulated the actions of the JCOs so as to ensure that the JCOs maintained contact with the appropriate members of the influence hierarchy. This was done for two reasons. The first reason was to report to SFOR the attitudes of people in a position to influence. The second reason was to enable, through regular contact with these individuals, an open channel of communication with influential members of Bosnian society. This way, the JCOs could intervene with the right people to warn them of the consequences of working to undermine SFOR's operations, or, in case of a crisis, the JCOs could help to resolve the crisis. This role was similar to a micro-targeted PSYOP.

For example, nation-wide, the JCOs had a deep level of contact with national military leadership, regional level police and NGOs. At the local level, JCOs had close dealings with political, NGO, economic and criminal leaders. The JCOs had a moderate level of

contact with national level political and police leaders, regional civic leadership, and local level police and civic leaders. The JCOs had a shallow level of contact with the rest of the influence hierarchy.

Based on the analysis at battalion (SFOR) and SOCCE (MND) level, the battalion decided that two groups were important: regional level military and local level police. The regional level military leadership was important. Soldiers out of uniform and off duty were a readily available pool of manpower to participate in anti-SFOR demonstrations. Local police were important in dealing with demonstrations that became unruly, thus contact with them was important. The battalion directed that JCOs deepen their contact with regional level military and local level police leadership. The messages that the battalion wanted the JCOs to convey was straightforward. Regardless of the arbitration decision, anti-SFOR riots would not be in the best interest of any entity. The second message was for the local police. Impartial and efficient administration of justice by the multi-ethnic Brcko police was critical in protecting the interests of all ethnic groups. When the announcement came, the JCOs placed themselves in position to influence the local reaction to the arbitration announcement and the event passed without any major crisis. This is not to say that the uneventful passage of the Brcko arbitration announcement was because of the JCOs, but the JCOs may have helped and were in a position to assist in resolving a crisis had one occurred.

Of course the weak link in all this was getting SFOR to communicate to the CJSOTF what it wanted the JCOs to do to support the SFOR campaign plan. Much of the guidance issued to the JCOs by the battalion and SOCCE were based on what the

battalion and SOCCE could infer from the commanders and staffs of SFOR and MND-N. This was due, at least in part, to the lack of doctrine for what SF was doing in support of SFOR.

SF doctrine did not assist SFOR or MND-N commanders or staffs in determining what SF could do to assist their operations. COMSFOR and MND commanders actually had conflicting ideas on how SFOR and MNDs should direct JCOs operations.⁶² Thus it failed the first test of adequacy. Second, SF doctrine did not tell SF units in Bosnia (with the exception of the Coalition Support Teams) what they should do to best support SFOR's operations. SF doctrine thus failed the second test of adequacy.

Finally, SF doctrine did not assist the SF unit in conducting pre-mission preparation for duty in Bosnia. This failure, however, was not debilitating because the period from December, 1997 to April 1998 was 3-10 SFG(A)'s second rotation in Bosnia as JCOs and 10th SFG(A)'s fourth battalion-sized iteration. By this time, a sound basis of lessons learned was available to help rotational units prepare for its mission in Bosnia. Institutional knowledge and lessons learned were the strongest guides to preparing units for the conduct of operations in Bosnia. Thus, SF doctrine was not adequate to assist 10th SFG(A) to provide the best possible support to SFOR. U.S. SF operations were successful nevertheless.⁶³

Chapter 5: The Future of Special Forces in SASO

“We will continue to provide the support that the warfighting CINCs ask for.”

MG Geoffrey Lambert, J-3, USSOCOM

The foregoing chapters have been an attempt to show how Special Forces have supported various Joint Force Commanders in different SASO environments. Special Forces are likely to continue to support conventional forces in SASO environments because of the skills they bring to those operations. Issues raised in the preceding chapters may hamper the full benefit of SF support to future SASO missions if the doctrine of SF is not updated to address the current operational context.

SF will continue to conduct operations such as these for several reasons. First, Joint Force Commanders conducting SASO will continue to benefit from a force having the attributes that SF brings to those types of operations. The 3rd SFG(A)'s regional orientation and language skills made that unit very well suited to conduct operations in Haiti. These same skills make SF well suited to support SASO missions in other environments. If a SASO mission lasts for a long duration, several months to several years, such as Haiti and Bosnia, then the advantages SF enjoys compared to conventional units will grow over time. Each conventional unit rotation brings in a new conventional unit which must learn about the mission area, whereas SF units conduct multiple rotations in the same area.

Second, SF brings other special skills to SASO environments that posture it to support the JFC in ways other forces cannot. The maturity, seniority, and operational experience of SF enable SF to adopt a modified force protection status in SASO environments.

Much has been made of the differences of attitude manifested by the soldiers of the 10th Mountain Division and that of the 3rd SFG(A) soldiers in Haiti.⁶⁴ While the former adopted a more conservative and protective stance consistent with their mission, the SF soldiers tried to appear more approachable to the local population. This "approachability" was critical to the success that SF enjoyed in supporting the Joint Force Commander.⁶⁵

This, in turn, allows SF to have special access to the attitudes and opinions of the local population. Conventional forces often have difficulty gaining this level of access. SF appears to be members of the U.S. military, but at the same time looking different. This benefits SF in a SASO environment. This effect played itself out in Panama, Bosnia and especially Haiti. The geographic dispersion of the 3rd SFG(A) and the comparative concentration of the 10th Mountain Division in two brigades size base camps amplified the effect. Distribution, language ability, and approachability make Special Forces particularly effective in SASO.

A lack of doctrine to support these missions may have limited the success that SF enjoys in SASO. This lack of doctrine may continue to limit SF's success in SASO in the future. Currently there is no doctrine to describe what SF is doing in the field on SASO missions. Each mission may be approached as a new mission. This does have the benefit of avoiding the tendency of units to approach a new mission as being similar to a previous one, but it also leads to an "*ad hoc*" approach. It also forces SF units to learn in the unforgiving school of experience. This lack of doctrine may be holding back the

success of SF in SASO missions, although the Special Warfare Center is working to address this issue.

Addressing the need for a doctrinal framework for SF support would solve many of these problems. First, publishing a doctrinal framework for what SF may do in supporting a SASO mission would tell Joint Force Commanders what Special Forces does or could do to support the JTF and its campaign plan. In this way, the supported commander could focus his mental energy on the details of SF support needed rather than creating a model from scratch for support needed. This doctrinal framework would thus make Special Forces more effective in support of their operations. Larry Cable of University of North Carolina Wilmington postulates that "peace operations" may be called a form of counter-insurgency operations,⁶⁶ a traditional SF specialty. Thus, SF can bring a different perspective to a SASO mission. The presence of SF soldiers on a conventional unit staff (such as happened in Haiti and Bosnia) could perhaps even assist the JFC in developing his campaign plan and articulating it more clearly and to a wider audience. SF commanders and staffs from all three case studies have said that they were not aware of a JFC campaign plan.⁶⁷

Next articulating a doctrinal framework for SF support to SASO could improve the overall effectiveness of SF units. Such a doctrinal framework could tell Special Forces units specifically what they may be expected to do in a SASO mission and how their operations support the overall JTF mission. In all of the case studies, there was some confusion at ODA level on which doctrinal SF mission the ODA was executing.⁶⁸ The understanding of the nature of the particular mission varied from team to team,

undermining unity of effort.⁶⁹ Some teams emphasized the CMO aspects of the mission while others emphasized the reporting of local attitudes. The actions and reports of such teams varied accordingly. This in turn, undermines one benefit of the program for the JFC: a view of his AOR from a single agency (the JSOTF) with a commonly shared, area-wide perspective.

Finally, adopting a doctrine for SF support may help guide Special Forces training in their preparation for SASO missions. The current "*ad hoc*" basis makes developing a consistent POI difficult. It also ensures that After Action Reviews from one SASO mission will likely not be applicable to another mission. Incorporating lessons learned from SF support to Haiti into SF training for Bosnia is a difficult task. This task is more difficult because there was no common doctrinal framework.

Thus far, this chapter has emphasized the lack of SF doctrine for support to SASO. It is appropriate here to outline a proposal on the doctrinal framework for SF participation in SF. Title 10 US Code, Section 164 and 167, designate SOF missions.⁷⁰ SOF collateral activities change more frequently and SOF do not train specifically for them but rely on their inherent capabilities to conduct them.⁷¹ Since designating a SASO mission may be both difficult and undesirable, designating it as a collateral activity would be more appropriate. One may start with a name to illustrate what the operations conducted under the task might be expected to accomplish. For that reason, the terms "pacification and legitimization" might be used to describe a collateral activity SF can do in support of SASO missions.

Borrowing from Dr. Larry Cable's thoughts⁷² again, these terms address the nature of SASO missions and SF support for them. First, if Clausewitz's dictum, "war is a continuation of politics by other means" is true, then peacekeeping is designed to remove military action from a particular political discourse. The Dayton Accords recognize this by accepting that competition between the ethnic groups will continue, but military action and genocide are not acceptable means of expressing that competition. Thus, the SFOR commander should have some means for monitoring those other channels of competition between ethnic groups and keeping that competition from becoming violent. Thus, the battleground in SASO is not the physical terrain, but the attitudes of the population, especially its key individuals.

For this reason, the first task that a "pacification and legitimization" mission should consist of is the reporting of local attitudes. This was a key function in all the case studies that SF performed for the JFC. The local attitudes can fulfill two functions. First it can provide input into JTF campaign plan design. In order to have the best chance of success a SASO campaign plan should focus *inter alia* on changing or modifying local attitudes and opinions. Second, local attitudes and opinions can be used as a feedback mechanism during a SASO campaign to measure the effectiveness of U.S. military operations.

A second task in a pacification and legitimization mission is related to the first and could be called "preventive intervention." In this task, SF can utilize its different force protection posture and *modus operandi* to gain access with key leaders among the general population and, when needed, to intervene with them to resolve crises or solve problems.

There is, of course, the risk that SF may convey a message that is not in tune with the conventional military channels. This risk can be mitigated if the JFC provides adequate guidance to the JSOTF to ensure that all sub-units are communicating similar messages. SF can also provide a channel of communications for local leaders to the U.S. military that is distinct from the channels through the conventional military.

Another task in Pacification & Legitimization mission could consist of "presence." In some cases, the simple presence of U.S. military units will enhance mission legitimacy and convey to the local population that the U.S. military is both legitimate and not to be deterred. SF's different *modus operandi* and training make it possible for SF to adopt a different force protection posture from that of the conventional units. When the 10th Mountain Division in Haiti established two brigade sized base camps in Port-au-Prince and Cap Haitien, it was left to the 22 SFODAs distributed throughout Haiti to show the American flag on a consistent basis and to demonstrate to the Haitian population the legitimacy of the U.S. military mission in areas outside of those two cities. Deploying a similar number of infantry squads, for example, throughout Haiti would likely have been riskier due to differences between infantry squads and SFODAs.

The next task in Pacification and Legitimization missions could be called "amelioration." Under this name fall those activities that simply make life better for the local population, and thus make them more likely to support the goals of the U.S. mission. This could be as simple as restoring electric lighting,⁷³ garbage service,⁷⁴ or getting courts running.⁷⁵ Of course this task may come to close to overlapping traditional Civil Military Operations (CMO) and paralleling the activities of Civil Affairs

(CA) units. In Haiti, there was little danger of that because most CA units were isolated with the infantry units in Port-au-Prince and Cap Haitien, leaving the field to the deployed SF units. In Bosnia, where the conventional units are more dispersed throughout the AOR, there is more danger of these two elements duplicating effort. Also there is more danger of diverting SF operations from the roles only they can do.

Finally, SF can conduct "legitimization" activities. These activities can be aimed at enhancing the legitimacy of two things. First, it can be very important to enhance the legitimacy of the U.S. and coalition conducting the operation. Second, SF can help legitimize either the host nation or peacekeeping agreement under which the peacekeeping operation has been initiated. SF can do this by managing the activity to be conducted and the perceptions of the target audience. For example, accompanying Haitian police in the execution of their duties, and ensuring that they respect human rights of the Haitian populace enhances the legitimacy both of the new Haitian government and the U.S. military effort in Haiti. Taking actions that ensure an even-handed application of freedom of movement for minority Serbs into Federation lands (and vice versa) enhances the legitimacy of the Dayton Accords themselves.

It must be noted that Special Forces is usually too small of an organization and neither equipped nor legally authorized to legitimize US, the coalition, or the peacekeeping agreement in the eyes of the general population. Managing the perceptions of the population as a whole is the role of PSYOP elements that are trained and equipped to do this. SF can, however, legitimize US operations in the eyes of influential key leaders in the society, provided the ODAs have some guidance on what critical events the JTF

foresees in the near term future. To provide this guidance it is necessary for the Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF), Special Forces Operational Base (SFOB), or Forward Operational Base (FOB) to have a means of receiving input from the JTF, conducting analysis of the mission and AOR, and providing guidance to deployed ODAs.

This leads to a final area in which SF doctrine could be updated in order to improve the performance of SF in SASO: long-term sustained command and control at the battalion and JSOTF level. In the 1998 Initial Draft of FM 31-20 the Joint Special Operations Targeting and Mission Planning Process (JSOTMPP) is described. The JSOTMPP process is oriented toward Direct Action and Special Reconnaissance missions and synchronizing them with the ATO cycle, and focuses on SO targeting in a timely manner to support the Joint Force Commander and integrate SF with other JFC assets. JSOTMPP has limited applicability in SASO missions. JSOTMPP is episodic and short term (72-96 hours) in order to relate with the JTF and JFACC targeting cycles. Also, the JSOTMPP process seems to be useful for nominating and planning potential DA and possibly SR targets. It does not address the long-term operations inherent in a SASO mission. To update SF doctrine and encompass current SF operations in SASO, a Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTP) manual may include a SASO targeting board for JSOTF, SFOB (Group), and FOB (Battalion) level.

An SF SASO targeting process will assist supported JFCs by showing what they should do to direct SF operations. This process, to be effective, must start with access to the Joint Force Commander and his Campaign plan and the JTF Plans Section. To be most effective, the JSOTF, SFOB, or FOB should have a thorough understanding of the

JTF Campaign Plan, JTF initiatives, and long term plans, so the JSOTF can develop supporting SF plans and issue the appropriate guidance. With interaction between the JSOTF, SFOB, or FOB and the Operations and Plans sections of the JTF, more effective SF support to the JFC is possible.

The JSOTF can then "maneuver" supporting SF elements to achieve the JTF's objectives a number of ways. First, the reporting of local attitudes. This is useful for the JTF as an input to their developing or updating the JTF Campaign Plan. It is also a useful feedback mechanism to monitor the success of JTF initiatives. This is true throughout operations, but especially true prior to or after key events. Second SF can support the Joint Force Commander through preventive intervention with key personalities during crises to resolve them. Third, by intervening in particular situations to enhance the legitimacy of the JFC in particularly in symbolic or highly visible ways. Finally by maintaining or enhancing legitimacy of the U.S., coalition, or the mission itself in the eyes of the key leaders of the local population.

Special Forces has contributed to the success of U.S. Stability and Support Operations over the previous decade. In all likelihood, SF will continue to participate in such operations as Joint Force Commanders will continue to have a need for the skills SF brings to these operations. Even though SF has been successful in the three case studies, SF may have been even more successful for the Joint Force Commander, if the doctrine for the utilization of SF had been updated to reflect the realities of what SF is doing in the field.

Endnotes

- ¹ The Joint Staff, *Joint Publication 1-02 Department of Defense Dictionary of Defense and Associated Terms*, (GPO: Washington, 1998), pg. II-2
- ² Franklin C. Bohle, *Army Special Forces: A Good Fit for Peace Operations*: U.S. Army War College: Carlisle Barracks, PA, 1997, pg.
- ³ FM 100-5 Writing Team, *Concept Paper 2: Operations*, (CAC: Fort Leavenworth, KS, 1999).
- ⁴ The Joint Staff, *Joint Publication 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations*, (GPO: Washington, 1998, pg. II-2.
- ⁵ Manuel Diemer and Thomas Joyce, "Special Forces Entry-level training: Vision for the Future," *Special Warfare*, Winter 1999, pg. 4.
- ⁶ Michelle Zazanis, Robert Kilcullen, Michael Sanders and Doe Ann Crocker, "Special Forces Selection and Training: Meeting the Needs of the Force in 2020," *Special Warfare*, Summer 1999, pg. 25.
- ⁷ Department of the Army, *Field Manual 31-20 Doctrine for Army Special Forces (Initial Draft)*, (USGPO: Washington, 1998), pg. 3-4.
- ⁸ Interview by the author with MAJ K. Barry, SF Enlisted Branch Chief, 26 OCT 99. The average time in the Army for an enlisted soldier in an SF Group is 13.4 years.
- ⁹ E-mail from LTC Kardos, Chief of Infantry Enlisted Branch, Total Army Personnel Command, to the author, 3 NOV 99.
- ¹⁰ E-mail from MAJ Barry, SF Enlisted Branch Chief, to the author, 26 OCT 99.
- ¹¹ Telephone conversation with MAJ Barry, SF Enlisted Branch Chief, with the author, 26 OCT 99.
- ¹² The Joint Staff, *Joint Publication 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations*, (GPO: Washington, 1998), pg. II-2.
- ¹³ Department of the Army, *Field Manual 31-20 Doctrine for Army Special Forces (Initial Draft)*, (USGPO: Washington, 1998), pg. v.
- ¹⁴ FM 31-20 ID, pg. 1-2.
- ¹⁵ Department of the Army, *Field Manual 100-25 Doctrine for Army Special Operations Forces* (USGPO: Washington, DC, 1991), pg. vii.
- ¹⁶ *ibid.* The same idea is presented in *Field Manual 31-20: Doctrine for Special Forces* in less stark terms.
- ¹⁷ The Joint Staff, *Joint Publication 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations*, (GPO: Washington, 1995), pg. vii
- ¹⁸ Center for Army Lessons Learned CALL Database Text Viewer, Fileroom: Operation Just Cause - Panama 1989-1990. 3-7 SFG A Co, OBSN, LESSONS LEARNED FROM OPN JUST CAUSE AND PROMOTE LIBERTY -- Page 3 of 23. CPT Stuart Bradin (Detachment Commander of SFODA 775) After Action Review for Operation JUST CAUSE. CPT Bradin writes in several places on the lack of training to enable SF soldiers to deal successfully with the mission they accomplished in OPL and the frustration of SF soldiers due to that lack of training and doctrine.
- ¹⁹ *ibid.*

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- ²⁰ Thomas Donnelly, Margaret Roth, and Caleb Baker, *Operation Just Cause*, (NY: Lexington, 1991), pg. 100.
- ²¹ Interview with LTC Charles T. Cleveland by the author, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 15 October, 1999).
- ²² Donnelly, et al. *op. cit.* pg. 351.
- ²³ Interview with LTC Charles T. Cleveland by the author, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 15 October, 1999).
- ²⁴ *ibid.*
- ²⁵ Interview with COL(P) Remo Butler at Fort Leavenworth, KS, 28 OCT 99. COL Butler was not intending to coin a new doctrinal term. He used the word "pacification" because, in the author's opinion, there is no adequate term in SF doctrine.
- ²⁶ Interview with MAJ Jon Marcus Custer by the author. MAJ Custer served in OPL as a detachment Commander in the 3rd Battalion, 7th SFG(A). Some of the Civic Action tasks the SFODAs performed were as simple as getting the garbage service working again. This helped eliminate a health risk to the deployed ODAs and improved the public image of the U.S. military operations in the eyes of the Panamanians.
- ²⁷ John Fishel, *The Fog of Peace: Planning and Executing the Restoration of Panama*, (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1992), pg. 49.
- ²⁸ In the opinion of that battalion's S-3, MAJ (now LTC) Charles T. Cleveland. Certainly, it was one of the busiest SF battalions the Army in the late 1980s. The 3rd Battalion had the advantage of being based in theater and the theater commander made extensive use of this asset.
- ²⁹ Ronald Cole, *Operation Just Cause*, (Washington, DC: The Joint History Office, 1995), pg. 51.
- ³⁰ Fishel, *Fog of Peace*, pg. 50.
- ³¹ CPT Bradin's AAR, CALL Database, pg. 2.
- ³² Interview with LTC Charles T. Cleveland by the author, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 15 October, 1999).
- ³³ Kretchik, et al., pg. 46.
- ³⁴ 10th Mountain Division, OPLAN 2380, (Fort Drum, NY: 10th Mountain Division, 1994), pg. 3.
- ³⁵ Kretchik, et al., pg. 71.
- ³⁶ *ibid.*, pg. 78.
- ³⁷ James L. Dunn and Jon M. Custer, "Operation Uphold Democracy: The Role of the SOCOORD as Part of a Joint Task Force," *Special Warfare*, July 1995, pg. 27.
- ³⁸ Kretchik, Baumann, and Fishel, pg. 166.
- ³⁹ COL Mark Boyatt, videotape #1 of the interview by Combat Studies Institute Dr. Robert F. Baumann.
- ⁴⁰ Kretchik, et al., pg. 71.
- ⁴¹ Kretchik, et al., pg. 142.
- ⁴² Boyatt interview with Dr. Baumann.
- ⁴³ Boyatt interview with Dr. Baumann.
- ⁴⁴ Bob Scacochis, *The Immaculate Invasion*, (NY: Penguin Books, 1999), pg. 12.

⁴⁵ Kretchik, *et al.*, pg. 118.

⁴⁶ COL Boyatt interview by Dr. Baumann.

⁴⁷ E-mail to the author from LTC Tony Schwalm, 14 November, 1999.

⁴⁸ Kretchik, *et al.*, pg. 121 and 195.

⁴⁹ Chad Storlie, "The Liaison Coordination Element: Force Multiplier for Coalition Operations," *Special Warfare*, Spring 1999, pg. 40.

⁵⁰ *ibid.*

⁵¹ Conversation with MND-N Joint Military Commission chief, LTC(P) Rabon, in Bijeljina, RS in December, 1997

⁵² William B. Buchanan, Institute for Defense Analysis Paper P-3389: U.S. European Command Support of Operation Joint Guard (21 December 1996 - 20 December 1997), pg. III-25.

⁵³ *ibid.* During one of the 1st AD's earliest resettlement problems, the 1st Armored Division had received reports that the VRS would move military forces into the ZOS to stop Muslim resettlement in the ZOS near Sapna. The Bijeljina JCO team leader found and talked to the VRS chief about the implications of a heavy-handed VRS response to Muslim resettlement, emphasizing the propaganda loss the RS would suffer at the hands of the Muslim propaganda machine. The VRS, in the end, did not violently oppose Muslim resettlement near Sapna.

⁵⁴ MG Meigs, when asked what he wanted the JCOs to do for him, held his hands out, palms facing each other, and wiggled his fingers. He said "I want this from the JCOs", implying a sort of *fingerspitzengefühl* or "fingertip feeling." The implication was that he wanted an kind of sensing of his AOR from another perspective besides his conventional commanders. Author's conversation with MG Meigs, 1 JAN 97.

⁵⁵ Buchanan, *op. cit.*, pg. III-25

⁵⁶ 3-10 SFG(A) Command Brief April, 1997. The MND-SW teams were in Livno, Bugojno, and Bihac. The MND-SE team was in Sarajevo.

⁵⁷ The origin of this model was drawn on a napkin in the Officers' Mess in MND-SW in Banja Luka during a conversation between LTC Charles T. Cleveland and SGM Ron Schuman. Author's interview with LTC Cleveland, December 1997.

⁵⁸ A spurious assertion, in the author's opinion. Access to the Sava at leads nowhere if the Serbs in Serbia refused transit of Serbian territory down river from Brcko. If the Serbs did allow such access, physical possession of Brcko was not required either. Although the town in 1991 was ethnically mixed and majority Muslim, the Serbs had the stronger claim, if for no other reason than that its loss would split their country.

⁵⁹ General Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP), Annex 2, Article 5. The tribunal consisted of one Serb representative, one Federation representative, and another to be agreed upon by the other two (or appointed by the International Court of Justice).

⁶⁰ Interview with MAJ Ken Tovo, then the SOCCE Commander at MND-N. According to MAJ Tovo, the MND-N was prepared to vigorously counter any military movement by either entity army in response to the Brcko Arbitration announcement. The storage of all heavy weapons outside of the town made entity military options difficult to execute and easy for SFOR to detect.

⁶¹ 3-10th SFG(A) Powerpoint Briefing to BG(Ret) Dick Potter at Fort Carson, CO, in MAY 1998. The unclassified briefing outlines, in the JCO Targeting Process used by 3-10 in its Bosnia rotation and its application in particular to the Brcko Arbitration Announcement.

⁶² Buchanan, *op. cit.* pg. III-25.

⁶³ *ibid.*

⁶⁴ Kretchik, *et al.*, pg. 108. For the SF attitude to the 10th Mountain Division's force protection policy, see 120.

⁶⁵ Kretchik, *et al.*, pg. 195.

⁶⁶ Larry Cable, "Getting Around in the Fog: The Nature of Interventionary Peace Operations," *Special Warfare*, (Spring 1998), pg. 32-40.

⁶⁷ Interviews with COL(P) Remo Butler, LTC Charles Cleveland, MAJ Ken Tovo, and LTC Tony Schwalm. In the cases of Panama and Haiti, the essence of the JFC's Campaign Plan seems to have been summed up best by the guidance COL(P) Butler received, "Keep a lid on this place." For more detail on the Panama SASO campaign, see John Fishel's *Fog of Peace*. According to MAJ Tovo, SFOR has had more success at developing a SASO campaign plan. Of course, Operation JOINT ENDEAVOUR, JOINT GUARD, and JOINT FORGE are longer term than Haiti, which may explain this difference.

⁶⁸ CPT Bradon's CALL database AAR and author's interview with MAJ Jon Marcus Custer who was a team leader in the 7th SFG(A) in Panama. Also, author's personal observations in the cases of Haiti and Bosnia. In the latter two cases, ODA level leadership was frequently confused as to the nature of the mission and the understanding of the mission varied from team to team.

⁶⁹ Just in the Haiti mission two cases are illustrative. In Ouanaminthe, the SF team publicly broke a FAD'H baton that had been used to beat Haitian citizens, while in Jacmel, when a Haitian civilian snatched a rifle from a FAD'H soldier, SF soldiers took the rifle from the civilian and returned it to the FAD'H soldier to demonstrate that the FAD'H was still to be respected.

⁷⁰ Joint Publication 3-05, pg. II-2.

⁷¹ Joint Publication 3-05, pg. II-11.

⁷² Dr. Larry Cable, *op cit.*, pg. 33.

⁷³ For example, Operation LIGHTSWITCH, which aided SF force protection, but also had the benefit of helping the restoration of law and order in the effected Haitian villages.

⁷⁴ Interview by the author with MAJ Marcus Custer 21 NOV 1999. In his mission in PROMOTE LIBERTY, his ODA traveled to Howard AFB to get garbage trucks that helped minimized the health risk to his team of the uncollected garbage and also enhanced the U.S. mission by showing the Panamanians tangible benefits of U.S. presence.

⁷⁵ Kretchik, *et al.*, pg. 119.

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